Promotions - Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles 2019 -

This superb study gives little space to debunking the myth surrounding Judeo-Bolshevism, the objective basis of which is, indeed, slim. Some Jews were communists and participated in the crimes of communist rule, but as Hanebrink (history, Rutgers) writes in chapter 1, useful generalizations about their motives are extremely hard to come by, and seeing them as typical of all Jews requires a suspension of respect for the abundant contrary evidence. Instead, the author attends to the multiple functions the myth performed throughout the 20th century and into the 21st. Although present in much of the world, Judeo-Bolshevism today plays its most important roles in Eastern Europe. Hanebrink has the languages that allow him to illuminate the myth's power, not just in interwar Germany--the usual focus of the literature--but also in modern Hungary, Romania, and Poland, where it has been much less studied. Looking at the period after the fall of communism, Hanebrink elucidates the transformation of the myth from a tool of demonizing a real, existing government to a symbol for right-wing politicians and intellectuals, a means by which to rewrite the history of the Holocaust as the just retribution for Jews' crimes against their fellow nationals, thus exculpating them for aiding Nazi genocide. This book is a significant achievement.Summing Up: Essential. Lower-division through faculty; general readers.

Terrorism, domestic or otherwise, fills the headlines of our newspapers nearly every day. It has become a part of the fabric of our daily lives, and shows no sign of abating. Lynn's new book is an exceptional study of terrorism in all its guises, from state-sponsored to "lone wolf" actors. Lynn has published widely on European military history and sets the entire topic of terrorism within a historical time frame, helping the reader understand that today's unsettling events are not new but have antecedents in the 18th-century French Revolution and even before that. Other recent studies, including Hoffman's Inside Terrorism (CH, Mar'99, 36-4148) and Laqueur's well-regarded A History of Terrorism (CH, Mar'16, 53-3257), are certainly valuable, but Lynn's sophisticated analysis is unequaled and makes his book an absolutely essential purchase for all libraries, big or small.Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty.

Armies of Sand is an encyclopedic treatment of a provocative theme: Why have Arab armies lost almost all wars they have been involved in since the end of World War II? Pollack (American Enterprise Institute), a renown military historian and analyst, covers the combat performance of 15 Arab armies and air forces, looking at all the regional states from Jordan and Syria in 1948 to Hizbollah in 2006, as well as the Iraqis and ISIS in the period 2014-17. But there is far more offered with a comparative analysis to the military performance of the Argentinians against the British, the Chinese and the North Koreans during the Korean war, the Cubans in southern Africa, and the South Vietnamese during their civil conflict. Pollack examines the performance of Arab militaries, searching for commonalities that explain their poor performance. The conclusion he reaches falls on several factors: an exceptionally heavy reliance on Soviet military doctrine while simultaneously benefiting from their assistance, the overly politicized civil-military relationship, the various elements connected to the effect of sociopolitical underdevelopment, and certain patterns of Arab culture. Pollack brings to bear his extensive military and intelligence experience to provide an essential read for anyone interested in politico-military affairs in the Middle East.Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty.

This hugely important work needs to be an inspiration for future works across the cyber field. While the literature in this massive, emerging field still focuses on the technical aspects of cyber warfare and cyber security, there is a long standing gap in need of filling when it comes to strategy and policy. Valeriano and coauthors cover the former and set the stage admirably for consequential works expanding on the importance of cyber policy writ large. Nuanced, subtle, and extremely well written, the work aims to explain what cyber strategy may actually be, how it comes in diverse forms not only across issue areas but across state interests, and whether or not cyber really does signal an entirely new and different era in warfare. The authors have no political agenda to push nor formal policy axe to grind. As such readers get access to a compelling and comprehensive argument that is valuable and new. Finally, it presents three crucial case studies of countries that are almost de facto essential for any work of cyber literature, but done from the exclusively unique angle of strategy: Russia, China, and the United States. A must read.Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty.

The Iron Curtain, which divided East from West during the Cold War, began to come down during Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985. Hill (emer., National War College) writes about the post-Crimea, refined dividing line between Russia and the West. Hill traces the politics of a drift from a vision of "Europe whole and free" to a new Cold War. This drift, he argues, emerged from numerous discrete decisions rather than from a deliberate plan. A central part of Hill's analysis is the role of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) in the Balkan conflicts and the evolution of NATO from a regional alliance to one of global capabilities and functions. His main argument is that Russian involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine and Russia's annexation of Crimea have "irrevocably shattered" the regional order in Europe, and a new order has not yet been defined. Although the book covers familiar ground, it is informed by Hill's experience serving in various posts in the departments of state and defense and in the OSCE. Valuable as a reminder of easily forgotten recent history, this well-documented book is required reading for students and scholars of East-West relations and those interested in the political evolution of Euro-Atlantic security architecture.Summing Up: Highly recommended. Lower- and upper-division undergraduates; graduate students; professionals; general readers.

One of the world's most pressing current challenges is how to manage the massive flow of displaced people fleeing violence. Because current asylum laws stipulate that persecuted people have to first reach a territory before they can claim asylum, leaders in the global North argue that as long as refugees and government agents are not situated in a common physical space, governments can refuse responsibility for the asylum seekers. In Refuge beyond Reach, FitzGerald (sociology and codirector of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Univ. of California, San Diego) documents how rich democracies deploy techniques of "remote control" to deliberately prevent refugees from reaching sanctuary. Meticulously researched and comprehensive in scope, the book traces how prosperous democracies of the global North--Australia, Canada, the EU, and the US--have deliberately and systematically violated the spirit of refugee protection laws by shutting down most legal paths for asylum seekers to claim asylum. Although these countries do not repatriate refugees, they have implemented a number of so-called remote control measures--including complex visa and air transportation policies, asylee caging on third-country territories, maritime interception policies--to keep out unwanted foreigners. Refuge beyond Reach is an invaluable and timely reference for all who are interested in protection of refugees.Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty and professionals; general readers.

Some contend that intelligence is the second oldest profession, and Andrew (Cambridge) agrees. To emphasize the point, he has provided in his new work a pivotal study concerning the history of intelligence that will stand the test of time. Contemporary intelligence studies, Andrew believes, suffer from what he calls "Historical Attention-Span Deficit Disorder," as scholars tend to overlook the rich history of intelligence operations when chronicling political decision-making. Many who join intelligence services have only the vaguest idea of the achievements of earlier code-breakers and spymasters. Andrew takes readers on a consequential journey from the Last Supper to the post-9/11 world to highlight his assumption. But more importantly, he demonstrates that intelligence operations have become what he refers to as the "missing dimension" in comprehending significant events in foreign policy and international affairs. Andrew claims that only by reviewing intelligence operations can we complete the historical record for future generations. What sort of intelligence assessments did civilian leaders receive before they decided on either war or peace? Andrew highlights the importance of intelligence and the associated dangers for those who discount the warnings of the clandestine services.Summing Up: Essential. General readers; upper-division undergraduates through faculty.

This cogent volume by Maull (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin) makes an important contribution to the literature on international relations theory and security studies. The centerpiece of this work is the status of order and stability on the globe since the end of the Cold War. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US was the preeminent creator of the "liberal international order." The rise of Chinese influence in global affairs combined with the diminishing effect of an American presence has called for a new power configuration. Maull divides the book's 14 essays into three parts: "Functional Partial Orders (International Regimes)," "Regional Orders," and "'Ordering Powers.'" The first section sets out the conditions for a structural arrangement at the international level, looking at international trade and climate change; the second section examines the regional approach, focusing on Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia; and the last and perhaps most important section offers a stark, candid appraisal of what the "liberal international order" was and the danger that comes with its erosion. This is an absolutely necessary read for students of international relations and those involved in international public policy.Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty and professionals.

Friedman (Dartmouth) makes an extraordinarily fine contribution to international relations theory and, more importantly, to rational choice theory. He analyzes with meticulous precision and a wealth of literature support an essential characterization in foreign policy decision-making: the element of uncertainty or the lack of perfect information in the context of any situation. Friedman's scholarship is an essential read to appreciate the efforts necessary for intelligence analysis and the assessment and evaluation of gathered information that becomes the basis for operational decisions. The author pays a great deal of attention to statistical probability and the qualitative evaluation involved in understanding the nature of international politics. To support his approach, he relies on a number of case studies involving flawed assessments. He then sets forth in a clear and logical manner a formula for dealing with uncertainty: Be aware of the degree of uncertainty surrounding the subject of the decision. Explain how the level of risk relates to the successful effectiveness of the decision. Provide a candid display of potential success with a percentage metric, and delineate the relative relationship between probability and confidence. This book will become a classic reference for those involved in intelligence decisions.Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty.

This is the kind of book whose cogent organization and clear writing sticks with you. The book distinguishes among three motives for cybersecurity breaches: financial gain, espionage, and revenge. Wolff (Rochester Institute of Technology) devotes multiple chapters to each kind of breach. Hackers who seek financial gain are easiest to catch, because it takes an elaborate organization and additional crimes to exploit credit cards and other information pilfered in an attack. Hackers motivated by espionage are the most difficult to catch. Once they have the information they seek, they are gone. Revenge attackers intentionally disrupt and damage the reputation of the computer systems they attack, and occasionally boast about the disruption. Wolff outlines the events that lead up to breaches, including the motives of the hackers and the organizational culture of the unwitting victim. The book concludes by making a convincing case that system designers could mitigate attacks by designing better systems. Organizations should monitor their systems better. Policy makers should establish clear security standards for system designers and organizations.Summing Up: Essential. Lower-division undergraduates through faculty.